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The Myth of Labor Board Expertise*
Julius G. Getmanf
Stephen B. Goldberg-
I. THE MYTH OF BOARD EXPERTISE
One of the central assumptions underlying the administration of the
National Labor Relations Act is that the National Labor Relations
Board has special expertise to determine the impact of employer con-
duct on the exercise of employee rights guaranteed by the Act. The
Board is presumed able to determine, for example, whether discrim-
inatory employer conduct is "inherently destructive" of the right to
strike or has only a "comparatively slight" effect on that right.1 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court has assumed that the Board can take into
account "imponderable subtleties" in weighing the effect of employer
speech on employee exercise of the right of self-organization 2 and that
the Board knows whether an employer ban on union solicitation on
company premises will prevent effective organization.8 Most recently,
* The research described in part II of this article has been carried out in collaboration
with Jeanne B. Herman, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois. Financial
support for this research has been provided by the National Science Foundation.
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
- Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
2 See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1949).
3 See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 US. 793 (1945).
The Board has not disclaimed these judicial assertions of its ability to determine the
impact of employer conduct on employee self-organization. For example, when the Board
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in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,4 the Court affirmed the Board's ability,
on the basis of its "expert estimate as to the effects on the election
process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity," 5 to order an
employer to bargain with a union that has not been chosen by a ma-
jority of his employees.
The assumption that the Board has the ability to assess the actual
impact of employer-or union--conduct is a fiction. Although it has
been administering the National Labor Relations Act for over thirty-
five years, the Board has never engaged in an effort to determine em-
pirically whether a particular type of conduct has a coercive impact.6
The Board has not required, or even permitted, the introduction of
evidence as to whether particular conduct had a harmful impact on
employees. As the Board has stated: "In evaluating the interference
resulting from specific conduct, the Board does not attempt to assess
its actual effect on employees, but rather concerns itself with whether
it is reasonable to conclude that the conduct tended to prevent the free
formation and expression of the employees' choice." 7 Thus, the elabo-
rate structure of Board rules concerning the circumstances under which
it will find a tendency to coerce employee choice is not grounded in
any respect on factual data. It rests, rather, on guesses or assumptions.
first required employers to furnish an employee name and address list to the union once
an election is directed, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217
(1966), it declined to require them to grant union requests for an opportunity to respond,
on company time and premises, to antiunion speeches; it preferred to wait "until after
the effects of Excelsior became known." General Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251, 61
L.R.R.M. 1222, 1223 (1966). And in General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 173, at 10, 79
L.R.R.M. 1608, 1610 (Mar. 30, 1972), the Board set out "to draw upon [its] knowledge and
expertise in evaluating the effects of any misconduct."
4 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
5 Id. at 612 n.32.
6 One of the first statements indicating judicial awareness of this fact was made in Get-
man v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which arose out of the authors' efforts to
obtain the names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in Board elections for the
study described in the text and notes at notes 49-55 infra. Speaking for the court, Judge
Wright described the Board as "an institution which in over thirty years has itself never
engaged in the kind of much needed systematic empirical effort to determine the dynamics
of an election campaign or the type of conduct which actually has a coercive impact." 450
F.2d at 675. The Board's lack of expertise respecting voter behavior has been recognized
by scholars for some time. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representa-
tion Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 88, 46-53, 88-90
(1964); Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. R-v. 228, 253
(1968); Note, Behavioral and Non-Behavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation Cases,
45 IND. L.J. 276 (1970). See also Lewis, Gissel Packing: Was the Supreme Court Right? 56
A.B.A.J. 877 (1970).
7 33 NLRB ANN. RaP. 60 (1969). See also Murry Envelope Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576,
47 LR.R.M. 1562, 1564 (1961); Lane Drug Store, Inc., 88 N.L.RB. 584, 25 L.R.R.M. 1360
(1950).
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There is, moreover, nothing in the collective activities or experience
of the Board that insures the accuracy of the assumptions upon which
these rules are based. As pointed out in a recent article:
The Board's staff consists mostly of lawyers and a few researchers
who are primarily concerned with the statistics of the Board's own
operations and with legal case analysis....
What the Board lacks notably is (1) specific information about
labor-management practices and employee attitudes and reactions
that may be pertinent to its work, and (2) any systematic means of
monitoring the impact of Board and Court NLRB doctrine upon
industrial practice .... Thus, the Board's decision-making fails
to provide a bridge between Board members, and the real world of
labor relations."
One wonders why the courts have accepted the myth that the Board
possesses expertise to determine the impact of employer or union con-
duct on employee free choice. Court opinions, which abound with
references to the Board's expertise, rarely discuss the question of how
the Board acquired its special competence. In part, the courts appear
simply to have assumed that because the Board constantly rationalizes
its rules in terms of the policies, language, and legislative history of
the NLRA, it has thereby acquired an understanding of the practical
implications of its decisions. But the process of elaborating and har-
monizing rules of decision cannot lead to the development of expertise
as long as the assumptions upon which the rules rest remain untested.
The courts' uncritical acceptance of the myth of the Board's exper-
tise may also be due in part to its usefulness in allocating institutional
responsibility. The myth helps to justify a fairly limited scope of re-
view. Since the courts possess no greater knowledge of the impact of
employer and union conduct on employees than does the Board, it is
sensible of the courts to permit the Board to make and apply the basic
rules with little interference. The Board is in a better position to estab-
lish a coherent pattern of regulation, serving the significant interest
of treating like cases alike. From this point of view, the Board's practice
of finding unfair labor practices on the basis of specific rules deduced
from assumptions about impact on employees has much to commend
it. It has helped to direct the attention of the Board and the reviewing
courts to the question whether the decision in a particular case is
consistent with the general holding of similar cases-and away from
8 Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE LJ. 571, 577-78 (1970).
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the question whether employee free choice was interfered with, a
question that neither the Board nor the courts are capable of answering.
In Gissel Packing Co.,9 however, Board and Court attention was re-
directed to the question of when employer conduct interferes with em-
ployee freedom of choice. The case involved the power of the Board
to order an employer to bargain with a union not chosen by a majority
of his employees in a representation election. The Court upheld the
Board's power to issue such orders where the Board found that the
employer had engaged in (1) "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor
practices that could not be remedied,10 or (2) "less pervasive prac-
tices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election processes."'1 In the latter situation
the Board can issue a bargaining order only when it finds that "the
possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair
election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though
present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through
cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order."' 2
The Court's language suggests that the Board is required to decide not
only whether the employer conduct in question had a coercive effect
on the election campaign just completed, but also the likelihood of its
continued impact or recurrence in a subsequent rerun election.
In the cases immediately following Gissel, the Board did not address
itself seriously to the questions posed by Gissel. It simply announced
its conclusions, using the language of the Supreme Court as a formula
to be invoked when the Board chose to issue a bargaining order.13 This
approach to the mandate of Gissel has, however, proven unacceptable
to the courts of appeals. In several cases they have denied enforcement
of bargaining orders or remanded to the Board for further findings
of fact;' 4 and in some cases the courts, expressing displeasure with the
9 395 US. 575 (1969).
10 Id. at 613.
11 Id. at 614.
12 Id. at 614-15.
13 See, e.g., West Side Plymouth, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 487, 73 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1969); Steele
Apparel Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 218, 72 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1969), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 437 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1971); Hancock Fabric Outlet, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 639, 72
L.R.R.M. 1432 (1969). This continues to be the practice in most cases. See, e.g., NLRB v.
World Carpets, Inc., 463 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1972); Tri-County Tube, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 5,
78 L.R.R.M. 1530 (Nov. 10, 1971); Almaden Volkswagen, 193 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 78 L.R.R.M.
1371 (Oct. 13, 1971).
14 See, e.g., NLRB v. Miller Trucking Serv., Inc., 445 F.2d 927, 931-32 (10th Cir. 1971);
New Alas. Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. General
Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 901-02, 905 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Board's performance, have made their own determinations of the im-
pact of employer unfair labor practices and their likely effect on the
outcome of a subsequent election. 15 The courts of appeals have not
questioned the ability of the Board to make the findings called for by
the Supreme Court. To the contrary, the theme running through the
opinions is the failure of the Board to make such findings with the de-
gree of care that Gissel seemingly commanded. The accusation that
the Board, when asked to make specific findings, has responded instead
with "a litany, reciting conclusions by rote without factual explication,"
has been quoted repeatedly by the courts of appeals.16
It is not surprising that when the Board orders an employer to bar-
gain with a union not elected by his employees, the courts have been
reluctant to grant enforcement merely on the basis of the Board's as-
sumed expertise. Such cases involve different and more significant inter-
ests than does the enforcement of an order directing an employer merely
to cease and desist from interfering with his employees' rights or even to
bargain with a union chosen by the employees. In neither of the latter
situations does the Board's order appear to run counter to the exercise
of employee free choice. In the Gissel situation, however, it does.'7
Since the Board's powers are supposed to be remedial rather than
punitive, the sacrifice of employee free choice arguably inherent in a
bargaining order could not be justified solely to punish the employer
for engaging in improper conduct.'8 The use of a bargaining order
in a Gissel situation can be justified only if there is good reason to be-
15 See, e.g., NLRB v. Copps Corp., 458 F.2d 1227, (7th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Henry
Colder Co, 447 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 351-53 (7th
Cir. 1971); cf. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1971).
16 See, e.g., NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1971), and NLRB
v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971), citing NLRB v. American Cable Sys.,
Inc., 427 F-2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1970), where the statement originated. In NLRB v. World
Carpets of New York, Inc., 463 F.2d 57, 62 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972), Judge Friendly noted that "[a]l-
though Gissel dearly mandates a reasoned analysis by the Board as to how the employer's
misconduct has jeopardized the chances for a fair election in each particular case, concern
has been voiced .. . that the Board's bargaining orders since Gissel have been deficient
in this respect." See also Progrebin, NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel: Wandering
From a Landmark, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 193, 201-07 (1971).
17 In cases in which a bargaining order is sought, the union has either lost an election,
or become convinced that it would lose and withdrawn the petition. Thus, current em-
ployee sentiment would appear to be counter to unionization.
18 Dean Bok argued that many times unfair labor practices are found and elections set
aside not because the conduct in question was likely to have a coercive impact upon em-
ployees, but because it was likely to give one side or another an unfair advantage in the
election. See Bok, supra note 6, at 58-56. Since no election follows a bargaining order,
however, justification of a bargaining order by this rationale would be inconsistent with
Gissel's concentration on the particular case.
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lieve that the employees' failure to choose union representation in an
NLRB election was the result of employer coercion and did not, in
fact, represent the true desires of the employees.
Another factor which helps to explain the close scrutiny given the
Board's post-Gissel decisions is the requirement that the Board's order
be responsive to the facts of the particular case. As noted above, the
criterion in most unfair labor practice proceedings is whether the con-
duct in question has a general tendency to interfere with employees'
exercise of their statutory rights. The impact in the particular case is
not critical. So long as the issue is cast in general terms, for a court to
disagree with the Board would require it to challenge the basic assump-
tion of Board expertise in judging impact. When, however, the issue
is cast in narrower terms-that is, whether this employer's conduct
has tended to prevent these employees from expressing their choice
on the question of unionization-the courts can disagree with the
Board's conclusions, or require greater substantiation than the Board
has brought before them, without challenging the basic assumption of
Board expertise.
While the courts have often referred to the requirement that the
Board make specific findings as to both the immediate and continuing
impact of the employer's conduct and the likelihood of its recurrence,
they have not specified how the Board is to make these difficult deter-
minations. Thus, the basic problem confronting the Board is that of
devising acceptable rules about the impact and probability of recur-
rence of unfair labor practices. 19 The task is a formidable one. As
Chairman Miller has stated, "No recent decisional task has more per-
plexed the Board, or confounded the courts which review [its] deci-
sions .... "20
Even if the Board were capable of making a realistic assessment of
the extent to which unfair labor practices affected votes in the original
election, how could it determine whether the impact would continue?
To make this determination it would be necessary for the Board to
consider factors such as the effect of the passage of time both in dis-
sipating the coercive impact upon the affected employees and in chang-
ing the composition of the work force between the two elections. Yet
the Board has been reluctant to consider these factors, arguing that to
19 In NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 884, 901 (2d Cir. 1971), Judge Friendly,
citing K.C. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTicE: A PRE MINARY INQUIRY 59-60 (1969), suggested
the possibility of hypothetical rule making. In view of the emphasis to be placed upon
specific findings in each bargaining order case, however, it is difficult to understand how
that practice might be useful in this context.
20 General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 173, at 12, 79 L.R.R.M. 1608, 1611 (Mar. 30,
1972) (dissenting opinion), supplementing 178 N.L.R.B. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1652 (1969).
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do so would be to permit the employer to profit by the delays inherent
in the procedure for remedying unfair labor practices. Some courts
have accepted this argument;21 others have not.22 But in no case have
the courts really required an elaborate inquiry into the question of
potential changes. They have enforced bargaining orders without such
inquiry, and when the courts have themselves made impact determina-
tions they have largely ignored this factor, focusing instead on the
nature of the unfair labor practice and the conditions that existed at
the time.23
Even subtler questions arise if the Board is to judge adequately the
likelihood that the unfair labor practices will recur. The Board would
be forced to consider not only the propensity of the employer to com-
mit further acts of the type found unlawful, but also the potential
deterrent effect of possible alternative remedies. There is, however, no
body of knowledge currently available that would permit decisions of
the latter sort to be made on any basis other than conjecture or surmise.
The lack of information is highlighted by the courts' demand for
greater specificity. In one case, for example, the Board was directed to
consider whether specific employees were likely to have been coerced
by a threat of retaliation.24 How is the Board to determine this? Some-
thing might be learned if Board agents were to question threatened
employees as to how they voted and why, but such questioning by gov-
ernment agents obviously undercuts the statutory requirements of a
secret ballot in Board elections. Moreover, it is not easy to attribute
shifts in voting intention to a specific cause. Voters may shift despite or
without regard to the questionable conduct of their employer. Assum-
ing that an employee is capable of sorting out his own motives, his self-
respect may dispose him against attributing his vote against the union
to the fact that he was frightened by the employer's statements. Indeed,
it is perhaps more likely that an employee who has voted in favor of
the union would be willing to testify that the threats had a coercive
effect on him. But such testimony would be difficult to credit, both
because the employee might think it of benefit to the union and because
it would be inconsistent with the employee's behavior. Thus, investiga-
tion of the actual impact of unfair labor practices on a case-by-case basis
is likely to be unproductive at best, and has the drawbacks of under-
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. Copps Corp., 458 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. L.B. Foster
Co., 418 F.2d 1, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
22 See, e.g., NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
American Cable Sys., Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957
(1970).
23 See cases cited note 15 supra.
24 New Alas. Dev. Corp. v. NLR.B, 441 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1971).
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cutting the guarantee of a secret ballot and inviting the manipulation
of evidence.25
Since specific inquiry about impact is not feasible, the Board will, of
necessity, respond to the demand for greater specificity by articulating
general criteria for measuring the impact of unfair labor practices in a
variety of circumstances. Three different factors are potentially rele-
vant to impact determination: the nature of the unfair labor practices,
the circumstances under which they were committed, and the demo-
graphic characteristics of the employees.
Board opinions make clear that the nature of the unfair labor prac-
tices involved is significant in impact determinations. The Board has
rarely elaborated, however, on the weight assigned to this factor or on
the basis upon which various types of illegal behavior are differentiated.
Instead, it frequently employs epithets such as "flagrant" or "egregi-
ous" in place of explanation.2 6 Some principles can, however, be deduced
from the Board's opinions. First, an unfair labor practice that is viewed
as "deliberate" or "calculated" is more likely to lead to a bargaining
order than one that is not. Second, much turns on the significance of
the interest being endangered. If the employer's statements or acts can
be characterized as threatening either a significant economic interest,
such as retention of jobs, or a fundamental legal right, it is more likely
to lead to a bargaining order.2s Third, acts of reprisal, particularly dis-
charges, are considered to be extremely effective in swaying votes and
very difficult to remedy.29 Not only is there a great deal of language to
25 Similar reasoning led the Court in Gissel to treat employee testimony as unreliable.
After the employer had threatened to take reprisals for union activity, an employee had
testified that he had signed an authorization card solely to secure an election and not to
designate the union as his bargaining representative. 395 U.S. at 608.
26 See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co., 195 N.L.R.B., No. 183, 79 L.R.R.M. 1670 (Mar 22, 1972);
Short Stop, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 79 L.R.R.M. 1571 (Oct. 14, 1971).
27 See, e.g., GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 134, at 32, in which the Board
stressed that the employer was "not one who violated the law without knowledge of its
sanctions. . . . [I]ts supervisors' misconduct was not accidental but intentional." Accord,
International Harvester Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 753, 72 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969) (employer ac-
tivities found deliberately and calculatedly designed); J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 254
n.3, 75 L.R.R.M. 1375, 1378 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971). Compare Thomas
Mkts., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 3, 77 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1453 (June 21, 1971), in which the
Board refused to issue a bargaining order in part because the unfair labor practices
were the result of an "honest, though misguided, effort to comply with [an earlier unfair
labor practice] settlement agreement."
28 See, eg., General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 173, at 4--8, 79 L.R.R.M. 1608, 1609
(Mar. 30, 1972): "A direct threat of loss of employment . . . is one of the most flagrant
means by which an employer can hope to dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining
representative."
29 "The Board has long recognized that a discriminatory discharge even of a single em-
ployee discourages support for the Union on the part of the remaining employees." Cor-
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this effect in Board opinions, but the coincidence of 8(a)(3) violations
and bargaining orders is notable3 0 Fourth, promises to correct the
grievance which led to union organization are also considered particu-
larly effective.3 1
These "rules" directed to the nature of the unfair labor practice
involved are unsatisfactory. They often confuse moral outrage with
impact determination. It is, for example, difficult to understand the
stress placed on the employer's state of mind. One would think that
the employees' perception of the employer's conduct would be more
significant than the employer's motive.3 2 Similarly, the nature of the
legal interest being threatened is relevant only if one assumes that em-
ployee reactions fall into patterns consistent with the analytical struc-
ture of the NLRA. Moreover, rules of decision based on such nebulous
factors as the nature of the legal interest being threatened or the delib-
erateness of the employer's actions are very difficult to apply in a con-
sistent fashion. In a sense, all unfair labor practices are deliberate, and
any threatened action can be characterized as inconsistent with funda-
mental statutory rights3 Thus, the bargaining order decision is an-
nounced but not explained by the Board's characterization of the unfair
labor practice as deliberate or as threatening a basic right.
While the other decisional principles referred to above do address
themselves to impact, their validity is questionable. What is threatened
nelius Am. Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 154,79 L.R.R.M. 1206 (Jan. 11, 1972). It demonstrates that
an employer has "completely rejected the collective-bargaining principle and its violations
could only have had the effect of destroying conditions needed for a fair election." Inter-
national Van Lines, 177 N.L.R.B. 853, 855, 71 L.R.R.M. 1887, 1390 (1969), modified, 448
F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1971).
30 See, e.g., E.L. Jones Dodge Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 77 L.R.R.M. 1297 (June 4, 1971);
George J. Roberts & Sons, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 76 L.R.R.M. 1337 (Feb. 9, 1971), en-
forced in part, 451 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1971).
31 See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 753, 754, 72 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1969):
"There are few unfair labor practices so effective in cooling employees' enthusiasm for a
union than the prompt remedy of the grievances which prompted the employees' union
interest in the first place." See also Texaco Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 434, 72 L.R.R.M. 1146
(1969), enforced, 486 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971).
32 Compare Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
841 U.S. 914 (1951) with NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). State of mind
may, admittedly, in certain circumstances, be relevant to the likelihood of unfair labor
practices recurring. "Deliberateness," however, is too ambiguous a concept on which to
rely in issuing bargaining orders. See note 33 infra.
33 The term deliberate is ambiguous. It can mean that the act itself was intended; that
the result was intended; or that the illegality of the act was known. In addition, a conse-
quence of the act may be treated as having been intended if it was foreseeable. See NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963). Because of this ambiguity, the effort to
make application of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA turn on employer motivation proved un-
workable and had to be abandoned. See Getman, Section 8(aX3) of the NLRA and the Ef-
fort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 82 U. Cam. L. Ray. 735, 743-50 (1965).
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may be less significant than whether it is likely to be carried out. More
serious threats may be perceived as less likely to be implemented and
may also carry a greater likelihood of backfiring. Acts of reprisal may
not be effective because they are not perceived as such by the employees.
When recognized, they may have the effect of solidifying union support
by showing the need for a union to protect employee interests, or
simply by making the employees angry with the employer. Whatever
coercive effect reprisals have may be dissipated when the acts are rem-
edied, as when employees discharged in retaliation are subsequently
reinstated. Responding to employee grievances once a union organiza-
tional campaign has begun may serve to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the union.
The Board's rules concerning the circumstances under which unfair
labor practices are likely to be effective are also based on certain as-
sumptions. It is assumed, for example, that the effectiveness of threats
varies directly with the status in the company hierarchy of the persons
communicating them.3 4 Certain types of threats, such as a threat to
clamp down on discretionary grants of leave, may, however, be more
credible when made by low-level supervisors, who make the actual deci-
sions. The assumption that serious threats, such as plant closings, will
inevitably be communicated in small plants35 is also questionable. The
extent and nature of communication about the campaign have never
been systematically studied, and it may be that employees do not discuss
the employer's campaign to any significant extent. Finally, each of these
assumptions about the differential impact of unfair labor practices,
depending upon their nature and circumstances, presupposes that there
is a basic identifiable unit of coercive impact. Yet both the existence and
amount of any coercive impact of unfair labor practices on individual
employees are highly questionable.
It is tempting to assume, as at least one court has, that it is possible
to predict the effect of employer conduct on demographically defined
subgroups of employees. The Seventh Circuit has announced several
times that young, old, unskilled, or part-time employees are more sus-
ceptible to coercion by employer unfair labor practices than are other
employees.3 6 The court has also assumed that the impact of an unfair
labor practice can be determined in part by the size of the city in which
34 See, e.g., NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971). See also NLRB v.
Copps Corp., 458 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1972).
35 See Blackman, Relative Severity of Employer Unfair Labor Practices, 22 LAB. L.J. 67,
70 (1971), and cases cited therein.
36 See, e.g., General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 173, at 5, 79 L.R.R.M. 1608, 1609
(Mar. 30, 1972); Scolers, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 78 L.R.R.M. 1858 (July 27, 1971).
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the company is located.3 7 None of these assumptions is necessarily valid.
Youthful, unskilled, and part-time workers may be relatively unsuscep-
tible to threats of reprisal since they may have the least commitment
to the particular job involved. Older employees with long service may
also be unimpressed with threats of job loss if, in a plant with no se-
niority system, they have seen other senior employees laid off before
younger employees with less service. They, or some of them, may fear
less the risk of job loss if the union prevails than the actuality of job
loss without a union. There is nothing to suggest that the impact of
unfair labor practices varies from one locale to another. Indeed, there
is simply no basis for assuming that the possession of any particular
demographic characteristic would render an employee more or less
susceptible to a grant or promise of benefits.
As this discussion should make clear, there is a great need for infor-
mation about the actual impact of unfair labor practices. We are aware
of two efforts to provide the Board with such information. One, a study
by Professor John Blackman 38 is of little value for this purpose since it
employs prior Board decisions as its primary sources of information as
to impact. Thus, the author simply asserts that company statements will
have a greater impact in smaller units, and that statements by higher
officials will have a greater effect on employees than threats by lower-
level supervisors.3 9 Indeed, the author compounds the weakness of the
Board's approach by adding to it his own "intuitive evaluations," as
when he states, without any empirical basis, that interference with pub-
lic distribution of literature, unfair use of company time and facilities,
and the offer or grant of benefits to individuals "are relatively minor in
their impact on the unit."40 The "study" in question is thus little more
than an effort to give the appearance of precision to what is in fact
sheer guesswork.
A more influential and ambitious study was undertaken by Professor
Daniel Pollitt.41 He sought to measure the impact of unfair labor prac-
37 NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971).
38 Blackman, supra note 35. The study, although unofficial, was "sponsored by the NLRB
as a form of operations analysis." Id.
39 Id. at 70.
40 Id. The author also takes the position that under certain circumstances negotiating
an agreement with one of two unions competing to represent a unit is a serious rejection
of the whole system of lawful procedures and "forecloses all opportunities for the em-
ployees to exercise freedom of choice." Id. at 71. For a contrary view, see Getman, The
Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma,
31 U. Cm. L. Ry. 292 (1964).
41 Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963). Previous field
studies of the impact of the campaign that are not directed specifically to the relative
severity of various unfair labor practices are reported in Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail
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tices and other improper campaign tactics by studying the results of
rerun elections. Unfortunately, however, in contrasting the rerun re-
sults on the basis of types of "unfair" electioneering practices involved
in the first election, Professor Pollitt did not control for other variables,
such as unit size, type of union, original margin of victory, or time lag
between first and second election, each of which, his study indicates,
may be related to the outcome of a rerun election.42 Nor was any effort
made to control for the type of campaign conducted by the employer
in the rerun election or for changes in the work force between the first
and second election. As a result, the Pollitt study does not establish or
even strongly support the conclusion that it reaches.
For example, among the rerun elections Pollitt studied, unions lost
a far greater proportion when the original election was set aside because
of threats to close the plant than when it was set aside because of threats
to eliminate benefits or to refuse to deal with the union if elected.43
Accordingly, he concludes that plant closing threats have a greater im-
pact than do other types of threats.44 A substantial proportion of the
cases involving a threat to close the plant may have occurred, however,
in large units, where Pollitt suggests a changed result is less likely, while
a similar proportion of the cases involving a threat to deprive employees
of benefits may have taken place in small units, where Pollitt suggests
Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LAB. L.J. 149 (1967); see San Fernando Valley
State College Political Science Department, A Survey of Voters in National Labor Relations
Board Elections (unpublished report prepared for the Los Angeles and Orange Counties
Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO (1968)); Comment, An Examination of Two Aspects of
the NLRB Representation Election: Employee Attitudes and Board Inferences, 5 AKRON
L. Rzv. 218 (1970). An unsuccessful field study is discussed in Roy, The Role of the Re-
searcher in the Study of Social Conflict: A Theory of Protective Distortion of Response, 24
HUmAN ORGANZATION 262 (1965). Archival studies include Drotning, The Union Repre-
sentation Election: A Study in Persuasion, 88 MoNT-LY LAB. REv. 938 (1965).
42 See M. RosENBERG, Tim LooC oF SuvEY ANALYsIs (1968).
43 Pollitt's sample contained 21 cases in which the first election was set aside because
of threats to close the plant if the union won; in only 6 of these cases (29 percent) did the
union win the second election. In 12 cases the first election was set aside because of
threats to eliminate benefits or to refuse to bargain if the union won; the union won the
second election in 9 instances (75 percent). Pollitt, supra note 41, at 215.
44 Professor Pollitt's conclusion has been accepted by the courts. In Gissel, Chief Justice
Warren pointed out that "[t]he study shows further that certain unfair labor practices
are more effective to destroy election conditions for a longer period of time than others.
For instance, in cases involving threats to close or transfer plant operations, the union won
the rerun only 29% of the time, while threats to eliminate benefits or refuse to deal with
the union if elected seemed less irremediable with the union winning the rerun 75% of
the time." 395 U.S. at 611 n.31. In NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 903 (2d
Cir. 1971), Judge Friendly said: "It deserves emphasis that the Court noted in Gissel...
that threats to eliminate benefits had been shown to have very much less effect on rerun
elections-and thus presumably on elections-than threats of plant closings, and cited
statistics impressively confirming this."
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a changed result is more likely. In short, the failure to analyze the re-
sults of rerun elections preceded by various types of "unfair" practices
in terms of other factors that might influence the results of the rerun
election makes the Pollitt study an unreliable basis for determining
the impact of the practices studied.
Even if Professor Pollitt had used more rigorous analytic methods to
insure that statistically significant relations existed between the vari-
ables with which he is concerned, his explanations of the causal factors
would not necessarily follow. For example, Pollitt's figures show that
unions had the worst rerun record when the original election was upset
on the basis of employer technical defects such as marked ballots or
campaigning too close to the ballot box. 45 Applying Professor Pollitt's
own reasoning, one would be forced to conclude that this conduct had
the most powerful "coercive" effect of all. It is doubtful, however, that
anyone would so contend. If the figures have any meaning, they prob-
ably indicate that the union did poorly in the second election because
the nonunion vote in the first election represented the true sentiment
of the employees. Indeed, this appears to be the author's explanation. 46
But how does one know that this phenomenon does not explain the
tendency for the unions involved in the study to lose the rerun elections
that followed a threat to close the plant? A tendency to similar results
in the rerun elections in both situations could indicate either that the
unfair practices in the first election had a lasting coercive impact, or
that they had no impact at all. Pollitt makes the first assumption as to
plant closing threats, the second as to technical defects. Perhaps his
different analysis of these two situations is based on the different reac-
tions of the "experienced eye." 47 But without some further empirical
basis for rejecting alternative explanations, these conclusions are un-
warranted.
The point is best illustrated by one election reported by Pollitt in
which the employer "pulled out all the stops," engaging in five different
violations of the Act. The union lost the first election forty-six to thirty-
six and the rerun fifty-one to eighteen. 48 Following the analysis adopted
in Pollitt's study, one would conclude that the vote against the union
in the rerun was attributable to the lasting coercive effect of the unfair
labor practices. That, however, fails to explain the much closer vote in
the first election, when the employer's conduct was fresher in the minds
45 Of seventeen such cases the union won the rerun in only three. Pollitt, supra note
41, at 215.
46 Id. at 216-17.
47 Id. at 215.
48 Id. at 214.
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of the employees. Neither Pollitt nor any of the courts deals with the
possibility that supposedly coercive conduct may have a negative effect,
convincing the employees, particularly those who had previously signed
authorization cards, that they need a union for protection. In the elec-
tion referred to above, it may be that the close vote in the first election,
rather than the lopsided vote in the second, was the result of the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. By the time the rerun was held, the
employees, being less frightened, might have felt less need for a union.
It is very difficult to tell which hypothesis is correct without knowing
much more about the second campaign.
Similarly, when Pollitt describes other cases involving threats to close
down, he fails to indicate the margin of employer victory in the first
election. Perhaps in most cases it was close enough to make the union
think it had a chance in the second election, but the employer succeeded
in reassuring the employees that they did not need a union to protect
them. Then the high percentage of union losses might be explained by
the fact that in many cases the union was deprived in the rerun of the
benefit of the fear engendered in the first election. We offer this hy-
pothesis not because we consider it more likely than the one suggested
by the author, but to demonstrate the peril involved in drawing con-
clusions about the impact of campaign tactics in one election by study-
ing the results of a second election.
II. THE EFFORT TO LEARN ABOUT VOTER BEHAVIOR
THROUGH A PANEL STUDY
A. Research Design
In recent years political scientists have been able to learn a great deal
about the effect of political campaigns on voting behavior.49 A major
methodological breakthrough in the study of voting behavior is the
panel or wave study, which involves interviewing a selected sample or
"panel" of voters at different points in a campaign. This technique
enables the researcher not only to ascertain whether the proportion of
voters intending to vote for each party has changed during the course
of the campaign, but also to identify those voters who have changed
their preference. Further analysis of the characteristics of those who
changed and their reasons for doing so is then possible.
The successful use of the panel technique in studying the dynamics
49 See, e.g., B. BERFLSON, P. LAZARSFELD & W. McPu=, VOTING (1954); A. CAmPBELL, P.
CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); P. LAzAsFELD, B. BERESON
& H. GAuDET, THE PEOPLE's CHOICE (3d ed. 1968); Glaser & Kadushin, Political Behavior
in Midterm Elections, in W. McPium & W. GLASER, PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 251 (1962). See also Burdick, Political Theory and the Voting Studies, in E.
BURDICK &- A. BRODBECK, AMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR (1959).
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of political election campaigns suggested to us that it might be used to
similar advantage in studying Board elections. We are presently en-
gaged in such a study. In each election studied, we interview a randomly
selected sample of employees twice. In the first wave of interviews,
which occurs before the campaign has begnn in earnest, we obtain at-
titudinal and demographic data for each employee in addition to his
voting preference. The second wave of interviews is conducted imme-
diately after the election. Changes in the respondent's attitudes toward
the parties, the way in which he actually voted, and his perception of
the issues in the company and union campaigns are all recorded. After
the election, we interview company and union officials, obtain copies
of all campaign literature and speeches, and identify the major themes
and arguments used by each side.50
B. Techniques of Analysis
In regulating election campaigns, the Board makes three basic as-
sumptions, upon which all of its more particular assumptions rely.51
These are: (1) that employees generally are attentive to the campaign;
(2) that their voting preferences may change as a result of the campaign;
and (3) that the specific effect of unlawful campaign tactics by em-
ployers is to intimidate employees into voting against the union.52 We
seek to test these assumptions in two ways. First, we try to predict how
each individual will actually vote from data collected prior to the cam-
paign. If we accurately predict the vote in an election prior to the
inception of the campaign, it would suggest that the specific content
of the campaign is largely irrelevant in shaping voting behavior. Sec-
ond, we compare the relative familiarity with the campaign of union
voters, company voters, and those whose allegiance changed during the
course of the campaign, and investigate correlations between familiarity
with individual campaign issues and vote. We single out for particu-
larly close analysis the relationship between perception of unlawful
speech or conduct and vote.
We use the following techniques to analyze the impact of statements
50 For the research design of this study, see Getman, Goldberg & Hermian, The National
Labor Relations Board Voter Study: A Preliminary Report, I J. LEGAL STumrEs 233 (1972).
See also Goldberg & Getman, Voting Behavior in NLRB Elections in N.Y.U. 23D CONF.
ON LAB. 115 (1971).
51 See generally Bok, supra note 6. See also Samoff, supra note 6; Note, supra note 6.
52 In many bargaining order cases the Board has taken the position that after a union
has obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees, a "subsequent diminution
of support, as revealed by the Union's loss in the election ... can only be attributed to
[the employer's] unlawful conduct." Overland Distribution Centers, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B.
No. 113, 79 L.R.R.M. 1188 (Dec. 23, 1971); see The Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 194 N.L.R.B.
No. 132, 79 L.R.R.M. 1087 (Dec. 30, 1971) ("extensive unfair labor practices quite ob-
viously achieved their objective ... for the Union lost the election").
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and actions currently considered unlawful. First, we note all employee
reports of speech or conduct that would probably constitute an unfair
labor practice and attempt to correlate reported perceptions with vote.
Then we correlate commission of unlawful action with vote across elec-
tions by comparing the amount of vote switching in elections where
unfair labor practices occur with the amount in elections free of unfair
practices. Finally, we note specifically how the commission of unfair
labor practices affects our ability to predict vote. If our precampaign
voting predictions are more accurate in legal elections, it would suggest
that unfair labor practices have some effect on the result. An error in
favor of the union would suggest that the unfair labor practices helped
the company; an error in favor of the company would suggest the
reverse.
C. Observations
Results of this preliminary research,5 although still far from conclu-
sive, are inconsistent with all of the Board's basic assumptions. Em-
ployees display a fairly low degree of familiarity with the campaigns
of the parties. We have been generally successful in predicting voting
behavior, including vote switching, on the basis of data collected prior
to the election campaign-that is, without regard to the nature of the
campaign. r> Those employees who intended at first to vote for union
representation but ultimately voted against the union (there have been
almost no changes in the other direction) have persistently demonstrated
the least awareness of the campaigns of both sides, suggesting that what
switching does take place is not in response to the campaign.
While we have observed a correlation between vote and employee
perception of employer unfair labor practices (regardless of whether
such practices have actually occurred), the correlation has been nega-
tive: those employees who thought that the employer had engaged in
unfair labor practices tended to vote for union representation. In addi-
tion, there has been no significant positive correlation between vote
and perception of unfair labor practices for any demographic subsam-
ples, such as older, younger, white, black, or male or female employees. 55
53 For a detailed analysis of the test findings, see Getman, Goldberg & Herman, supra
note 50.
54 Prediction has been made on the basis of a formula developed by regression analysis.
The formula takes into account the employee's attitudes toward his job and the union
and his precampaign voting intention.
55 The data thus far do not support, therefore, the position of those courts that have
suggested that the Board tailor its issuance of bargaining orders to the demographic
characteristics of the bargaining unit involved. Meaningful findings as to the impact of
unfair practices on demographically defined subgroups would require subsamples large
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D. Utilization of Voter Studies
By examining the Board's basic assumptions concerning voter be-
havior, studies such as ours should help the Board to develop an accu-
rate model of employee behavior. This, in turn, should permit the
articulation of more accurate guidelines for determining the impact
of unfair labor practices. One way in which our study can help is by
indicating the normal parameters of vote changing in illegal elections.
We have been able thus far to predict the vote of approximately 80
percent of the electorate regardless of the legal or illegal nature of the
campaign.B If we can continue to do so in all elections, including those
in which substantial unlawful conduct occurs, it would suggest that less
than 20 percent of the electorate is susceptible to influence by the con-
tent of the campaign. Moreover, the number of people whose vote we
are unable to predict will inevitably be greater than the number whose
votes are changed by the employer's unfair labor practices. Some of our
errors are for employees who we predicted would vote against the
union but who vote for it. Of those who do vote against the union,
some do so for reasons unrelated to the campaign. Respondents who
we predicted would vote for the union but who vote for the company
show no greater awareness of the campaign than those whose vote we
predicted accurately. They do not have any greater tendency to report
unfair labor practices, thus indicating that our inability to predict their
vote is not related to their perception of the campaign or to their
awareness of unfair labor practices. A Board decision, then, not to issue
bargaining orders following elections in which the union's margin of
defeat was greater than 20 percent would be quite consistent with our
findings and with the policy of Gissel.57
III. CONCLUSION
The Board is currently in an unenviable position. It has been di-
rected by the courts to be more specific about the impact of employer
misconduct before issuing a bargaining order. But the degree of speci-
ficity required is unclear and the Board is incapable of making detailed
findings about the impact of unfair labor practices. Neither changes in
enough to insure the statistical significance of any differences among them. In view of the
small sample of all employees whose votes appear to be affected by unfair labor practices,
we do not expect to be able to make meaningful findings for demographic subgroups, al-
though we shall continue to test for them.
586 See Getman, Goldberg & Herman, supra note 50. As our sample gets larger and the
number of prediction errors thereby increases we intend to engage in systematic analysis
of deviant cases to determine the sources of error and to correct our mistakes.
57 895 U.S. at 612. Similarly, the Board could decide not to entertain election chal-
lenges in such cases.
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the Board's investigative techniques nor existing scholarship can pro-
vide the Board with this ability. Voting studies such as ours may, when
completed, provide some basis for making more informed decisions,
but even then many of the questions that the Board is supposed to
address may remain unanswered. What is the Board to do now?
One possibility would be to stop issuing bargaining orders altogether
on the theory that there exists no empirical basis on which to find in
any case that the employer's conduct prevented the expression of ma-
jority employee sentiment for union representation. On the other hand,
it can fairly be said that there presently exist no empirical data that
conclusively disprove the Board's assumptions as to impact, and the
Supreme Court plainly contemplated the issuance of bargaining orders
when serious or numerous unfair labor practices are committed. It
might also be argued that elimination of the possibility of a bargaining
order would encourage the commission of unfair labor practices and
that, when employees are in fact coerced by employer conduct, there is
no other effective remedy. 58
Perhaps the most prudent course for the Board is to proceed cau-
tiously in the issuance of bargaining orders, especially when the margin
of union defeat is substantial. Second, the Board should simplify its
guidelines for issuing a bargaining order, declining the judicial invita-
tion to take into account the particular characteristics of the employees
and employer so long as there is no statistical evidence that they are
relevant. The Board should also use scientific studies of political voting
behavior and, as it becomes available, field research in Board elec-
tions.59 To the extent that the Board feels that political voter studies
are inapposite or voting studies such as ours are misleading, it should
articulate its reasons for so concluding. The courts in turn should be
realistic in reviewing bargaining order decisions. Specific findings as to
impact are not possible and should not be required. The most that can
be asked for is a reasoned explanation of the Board's conclusions, taking
into account what is known about voting behavior.
58 Indeed, some observers have questioned the efficacy of the bargaining order when it
stands alone, and have urged that it be accompanied by back pay to compensate employees
for the benefits lost by the employer's refusal to bargain. See International Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLR.B, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); St. Antoine,
A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1039 (1968).
59 Chairman Miller recently made an effort to do this. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 194
N.L.R.B. No. 150, 79 L.R.R.M. 1148 (Jan. 14, 1972) (concurring).
